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Financial Incentives and Drug Spending in Managed Care
Abstract
Pharmaceutical costs have been rising dramatically since 1995, growing 16.6% in 1998 alone. This rate of
increase is more than four times that of all health care spending. Employers, managed care organizations and
consumers are looking anew for ways to stem these rising costs, without denying patients effective care.
Therefore, this Issue Brief is especially timely because it investigates how patient copayments and financial
incentives for physicians affect drug spending in managed care.
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Editor’s note: Pharmaceutical costs have been rising dramatically since 1995,
growing 16.6% in 1998 alone.  This rate of increase is more than four times
that of all health care spending.  Employers, managed care organizations and
consumers are looking anew for ways to stem these rising costs, without
denying patients effective care.  Therefore, this Issue Brief is especially timely
because it investigates how patient copayments and financial incentives for
physicians affect drug spending in managed care.
Financial Incentives and Drug Spending in
Managed Care
Managed care plans use
different mechanisms to
control prescription
drug costs
As prescription drug expenses take up more of premium revenues (up from
5.4% in 1990 to 11.4% in 1997), health insurers and managed care plans
have tried various methods of controlling these costs.  Some mechanisms
focus on the physician, while others target the patient.   They include:
• administrative controls, such as formularies (lists of approved drugs), and
drug utilization review (review of expensive prescriptions or prescribing
patterns, with feedback to physicians about appropriateness).
• patient cost-sharing, in the form of flat fee copayments, annual
deductibles that must be met before coverage begins, or annual dollar caps
(maximums) on the amount of  prescription drugs covered per person.
Some plans encourage generic substitution by having higher copayments
for brand-name drugs when a generic is available.
• physician financial incentives that put physicians at financial risk for the
drugs they prescribe.  This can be accomplished by including prescription
drug costs in capitated payments to physicians, or by using drug costs in
calculations of bonuses or withheld amounts for physician payments.
New study helps to
understand how patient
and physician financial
incentives affect drug use
Patient cost-sharing and physician financial incentives are widely used by
managed care plans.  But do these mechanisms control drug spending?
Previous studies have focused on Medicaid or Medicare recipients, and have
not answered this question in middle-class populations.  Hillman and col-
leagues conducted a study to look at both mechanisms, and the interaction
between them.
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• The study used claims data from nine health plans in six states, managed
by United HealthCare Corporation. Study subjects were enrollees in
employer-sponsored group plans.
• Five plans were independent-practice association (IPA) models, in which
physicians were paid fee-for-service.  The IPA-plan physicians had no
financial incentive to control drug spending.
• Four plans were network models, in which primary care physicians were
paid on a capitated basis.  The capitated amount covered the cost of all
ambulatory services, including drugs.  Therefore, network plan physicians
had a financial incentive to control drug costs.
• Each plan had differing levels of patient cost sharing for drugs.  Patients
paid a flat fee (ranging from $2 to $10) at the time of filling or refilling a
prescription at a retail pharmacy. These copayments did not differ for
generic vs. brand-name drugs.
Higher drug copayments
led to lower drug spending
in IPA plans, but had no
effect in network plans
In IPA plans, where physicians had no financial incentive to control drug
spending, higher copayments for drugs were associated with lower drug
spending.  In network plans, however, where physicians had incentives to
control drug spending, patient copayments had no significant effect.
• Even a modest increase in copayment levels had an effect in IPA plans.
For example, increasing the copayment from $5 to $7.50 led to a 12.3%
reduction in drug spending.
• At all levels of drug copayments, IPA plans spent more on drugs per
member than network plans.  For example, annual drug spending per
member with a $2 copayment was $229 in IPA plans, vs. $145 in network
plans; at a $10 copayment, IPA plans spent $139, vs. $125 in network
plans.  Drug spending decreased more rapidly in IPA plans in response to
higher copayments.
• A $10 copayment in an IPA plan is almost as effective at controlling drug
spending as switching physicians from fee-for-service to capitated pay-
ment, since annual drug spending per member at a $10 copayment is close
to what network plans spent at any level of copayment.
Copayments in IPA plans
worked by reducing
quantity of prescriptions
filled, not price
Financial incentives can affect drug spending by reducing the number of
prescriptions filled, or by reducing the price per prescription filled.
• IPA plan members had a higher prescription quantity than network
members, but there was no difference in the average price of the
prescription.
• In both plan types, higher drug copayments were associated with fewer
prescriptions, and with an increased average price of a prescription.
Copayments in IPA plans
reduce the likelihood of
having any drug claims, as
well as the average amount
spent per person with some
drug spending
The study investigated whether copayments primarily affect members with
high drug utilization, or reduce the likelihood of members receiving any
prescriptions at all.
• In IPA plans, members with higher copayments were less likely to have
any drug claims.  Members with a $2 copayment had a 60% likelihood
of any drug claim in one year. This dropped to 46% for members with a
$10 copayment.
• In IPA plans, members with at least one drug claim had lower annual drug
spending at higher copayment levels.  Members with a $2 copayment and
at least one claim had average annual drug spending of $385.  This
dropped to $303 for members with a $10 copayment.
• Copayments in network plans had no significant effect on the likelihood
of having a claim, nor on the average amount spent per member with at
least one claim.
Higher copayments for
office visits led to lower
drug spending in both IPA
and network plans
The study also investigated how member cost-sharing for office visits affected
drug spending.  Do patients and physicians substitute drugs for office visits
when copayments are high? Or do higher physician-visit copayments discourage
office visits and consequently, the prescriptions that often accompany visits?
• For office visits, patients paid a flat fee (up to $22) at the time of the office
visit. At all levels of physician-visit copayment, drug spending was higher
in IPA plans.
• The effects of physician-visit copayments on drug spending is considerably
smaller than the effects of drug copayments.   For example, increasing the
copayment from $5 to $7.50 led to a 2.8% reduction in drug spending in
IPA plans, and a 1.8% reduction in network plans.
• These results suggest that prescription drugs are complements to, rather
than substitutes for, office visits.
INTERPRETATION:
Both patient cost sharing
and physician financial
incentives can control drug
spending
Financial incentives directed at patients and those directed at physicians have
independent effects, but also interact with one another.
• These findings suggest that one way to reduce drug spending is to make
physicians bear risk for the cost of drugs they prescribe.  Another way of
achieving this goal without putting physicians at risk is to require modest
levels of patient cost sharing.
• If physicians’ motivation to curb drug spending is low, as in the IPA plans,
their willingness to write prescriptions is high.  In that case, patient
copayments may have an important impact, as patients request fewer
prescriptions or decide not to fill prescriptions they regard as discretionary.
• If physicians’ motivation to curb drug spending is high, as in the network
plans, they may be limiting prescriptions to clearly indicated drugs only.
In that case, patient copayments would have little or no impact, since the
level of discretionary or elective drugs is already low.
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This study helps to fill in the still incomplete picture of how financial incen-
tives for both patients and doctors affect prescription drug use.
• Managed care organizations should consider the context in which patient
copayments are used to control drug expenditures.  Increasing patient
copayments, for example, is not likely to be effective when primary care
physicians are at risk for the drugs they prescribe.
• On the other hand, an exclusive focus on physician financial incentives
will not address the consumer demand for drugs, which may be increased
through heavy marketing practices.  In 1998, pharmaceutical firms spent
an estimated $1.3 billion on consumer advertising in the U.S.
• The critical challenge is to determine the effects of these financial incen-
tives on outcomes of care, a question not addressed by the study.  Further
research is needed to determine whether drugs with small effects on
health, large effects on health, or both, are sensitive to such incentives.
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